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Abstract
Contract provisions specifying the law or forum (either judicial or arbitration) have begun
appearing in litigated cases, as businesses have pressed many courts for their
enforcement against consumers.  In at least some of the cases, enforcement of a
choice of law provision results in the displacement of the consumer’s home state
protection by the lesser consumer protection of the State of the form drafter’s choosing. 
This phenomenon raises serious problems of federalism and local control of consumer
protection.  But while considerable scholarly attention has been lavished on so-called
“mandatory arbitration” in this context, much less has attempted to improve our
understanding of the workings of choice of law and forum clauses, and of the important
implications of their widespread enforcement.  The cases reflect very little
understanding of these provisions as contract provisions, and the literature tends to
approach the provisions primarily as conflict of laws problems.  This may have
obscured the contract that is at the core of these provisions and thereby made a full
appreciation of the contract law issues harder to come by.  This article attempts to bring
more clarity to the analysis.  It does so first by building an analytical framework that
separates the conflicts and contracts issues for analysis.  After developing that
framework, the article takes that expanded analysis to a very important recent California
case.  It concludes by suggesting areas for further study now that the contract issues
within these provisions are more clearly evident.
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1.  Professor Radin distinguishes between the kinds of contracts that are founded on true
consent by the bound parties and the forms promulgated by businesses that purport to bind without
any semblance of consent.  Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 Ind.
L.J. 1125 (2000).  Because whether such forms bind consumers and small business people to choices of
law, forum, and arbitration is one of the questions being examined here, I will try to avoid putting the
rabbit into the hat by calling these business relationships “contracts.”  See also Arthur Leff, Contract as
Thing, 19 Am. U. L. Rev. 131 (1970).
2.  See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 553,
554-55 (1989).
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INTRODUCTION
Pick up a conflict of laws text or most law review articles and you will find
considerable attention lavished on both choice of law and choice of forum clauses in
business dealings.  Both are nearly ubiquitous in modern business relationships of all
kinds, from carefully negotiated contracts among large businesses to mass market
forms that businesses promulgate1 en masse to consumers.  Both kinds of clauses have
received an extraordinary amount of attention in the conflict of laws literature and
the attention heaped on them is probably well-earned.  
Several different jurisdictions usually have the power to decide a given contract
dispute.2 Absent an enforceable choice of forum clause, a party can “shop” for the
most beneficial forum in which to litigate (by simply filing suit there) when the
contractual relationship has broken down.  This can yield benefits for the plaintiff in
the form of geographic advantage or local favoritism over the defendant or, in more
subtle forms such as the law a tribunal will apply to the problem, or civil procedure
limitations endemic to the chosen forum.  Absent a binding choice of law clause,
parties to a contract face the prospect of litigating under a set of legal rules that was
not within their frame of reference when they made their underlying contract.  In
both cases, the commercial uncertainty can decrease the value of the exchange itself.
The well-earned attention to such provisions has generally come from the
conflict of laws literature and has focused on the consequences of such purported
agreements, once they are made.  Assuming a choice of forum agreement, under what
circumstances must a court enforce it and under what circumstances might a court
refuse enforcement?  What are the existing and optimal limitations to the parties’
contractual power to choose their law within their contract?  Is the enforcement of
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choice of law clauses, assuming they are agreements, subject nonetheless to exceptions? 
These are questions that pit the autonomy of the parties to manage their own affairs
(“party autonomy”) against the jurisdiction’s own power either to exercise
jurisdiction over them despite their contrary agreement, or to use the law of its
choosing to determine their dispute.  
What has been largely missing from the work thus far is a focus on a preceding
set of threshold questions: 1) whether the parties’ purported agreement to a choice of
law or a choice of forum clause ought, as a matter of contract law, to be enforceable and
2) under whose contract law should that question be answered.  These questions
focus on an individual’s autonomy to contract or not to contract, and on the State’s
legal recognition (typically, as a matter of economics or commerce) of private
ordering. The conflict of laws scholarship and commentary have assumed the contract
law questions were relatively settled in this context and proceeded from there; the
contracts literature has, by and large, simply ignored the threshold contract questions
which might demand different treatment in some contexts than in others.
The rapidly developing pace of globalization has made both choice of law and
choice of forum clauses far more important economically than they were thirty years
ago.  These same forces have brought into sharp focus the need to consider sensible
mechanisms to limit the uses to which such provisions might be put.  Two recent
developments show why a focus on the contracts questions is important.  
First, we now see the aggressive use of choice of law clauses in consumer and
small business settings to a degree unimagined in the late 20th Century and this
development threatens to undermine the consumer law States have developed in the
last 50 years.   To give a simple example, unconscionability, a major tool in contract
policing is most often put to work when a consumer or small business has received
onerous terms through a vendor’s form.  Very few would think that a vendor could
avoid an unconscionability challenge by simply adding a “waiver of
unconscionability” to that very form.  Yet, a modern drafter might well accomplish
the same thing by “choosing” the law of a place with weaker consumer protection and
arguing that, as a matter of contract, the customer is bound by that “choice of law.”
We now find businesses pressing this argument in litigation; at least one court (and,
probably, countless arbitrators) have accepted the argument.
Because vendor forms are promulgated en masse, the effect of judicial decisions
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3.  Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements, http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98 (last visited July 26,
2005).
4.  The Am. Law Inst., Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis and
Proposed Federal Statute, Proposed Foreign Judgments Recognition and Enforcement Act [hereinafter
“ALI International Judgment Recognition Project”] § 5(b) cmt. f (April 11, 2005).
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recognizing this power is the replacement of one State’s set of unconscionability
norms by another set, that of the State of the drafter’s choosing.   And if this can be
done with unconscionaibility, it can probably be done with any State contract rules
protecting consumers and small businesses.  Some recent cases suggest that wholesale
displacement of a State’s consumer and small business protections may be a real
danger.  
If this is happening, the evidence suggests that it is taking place without either
advocates or courts understanding the full range of possibilities that contract law
might offer -- very few courts focus on the question whether the choice of law clause is
itself enforceable as a matter of contract law.  This, in turn, is due to the fact that
these problems are thought of a conflict of laws problems, not as contract problems,
and the intellectual complexity comes with conflict of laws has effectively hidden the
contract that is at the core of these provisions.  We need to understand the law that
applies to these provisions better:  badly-analyzed judicial decisions will have ripple
effects for years in unreported arbitration decisions and in negotiations that
inevitably accompany dispute resolution.  In addition, a better understanding of the
workings of these provisions is essential for conscious, transparent policy making
going forward.
The second development underscoring the importance of the contract
questions in this area is connected to choice of forum clauses, again showing up
increasingly in vendors’ forms.  Both a recent Hague Convention3 and the American
Law Institute’s Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis and Proposed
Federal Statute4 address judgments entered in violation of agreements to litigate in an
exclusive forum specified in the underlying contracts.  In both cases, and with few
exceptions, the contractual choice of forum provision will have a great impact on the
enforceability of the resulting judgments. 
Both of these statements of policy, while not the law anywhere yet, raise
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5.  Professor Speidel correctly observes that “binding mandatory arbitration” is a misnomer in
that it conveys a sense that it is not based in assent but rather is imposed.  Richard E. Speidel,
Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-dispute (Mandatory)Arbitration Outlived its Welcome?, 40
Ariz. L. Rev. 1069 (1998).  But true assent is surely missing in most consumer arbitration agreements
that are enforced by courts and, therefore, it’s no wonder that the popular sense is different from how
arbitration works in theory.  I use the term here because consumer advocates have begun using it as
shorthand in efforts to use the market to change business behavior by urging consumers not to do
business with vendors who use BMA and giving consumers information on those vendors who do not
require it.  See www.givemebackmyrights.com for a website that makes good use of this shorthand.
6.  Cf. Eugene F. Scoles et al., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11.3 at 481 (4th Ed. 2004).
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complex issues related to, but distinct from, those raised by the widespread use of
choice of law clauses in vendor forms.   But they have this in common:  choice of
forum clauses, like choice of law clauses, have been analyzed as conflict of laws
provisions and, once again, the analysis has tended to obscure the contract in the
process.  The new developments on the international front will make understanding
the full richness of these provisions more essential than ever.
A discussion of choice of law and forum clauses in business forms could not be
complete without also addressing, at least in summary form, binding mandatory
arbitration (“BMA”).5 This is a form of forum selection6 but the Supreme Court’s
expansive interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) makes focus on the
contract questions essential.   An arbitration clause triggers the FAA and, with it, a
series of decisions interpreting the Act to broadly favor arbitration and to strongly
preempt State law, even in adhesion contract settings.  The Act, and the decisions
interpreting it, specify, however, that State contract law defenses remain valid; only
when a court finds there is an enforceable agreement to arbitrate does FAA
preemption sweep away nearly all other challenges to BMA.   Because of this, the
contract law challenges to BMA are far better developed than they are to choice of
forum clauses, and looking at them can inform a discussion of choice of forum
clauses.  In addition, the arbitration cases occasionally beg the question whose
contract law decides the contractual validity of an arbitration clause?  If the form
that contains the arbitration clause also contains a choice of law clause, as it usually
does, the analysis becomes complex and, judging by the decisions, inadequately
understood.
That the increased use of choice of law, forum, and arbitration clauses can
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adversely affect the customers who receive them has been evident for many years. 
But these developments may also imperil State consumer and small business
protections more generally.  This may be cause for concern in those States that wish
to maintain local control over the protections they offer to those customers who are
on the receiving end of adhesion contracts.  
The conflict of laws lens through which we have observed choice of law and
forum clauses gives a very incomplete picture, one that limits the imagination both of
lawyers and of legislatures.  This article aims fix that, by improving our ability to see
the legal doctrine under which these provisions work and showing how a better
understanding can lead to better policy options for addressing them. The objectives
here are very modest: simply to expose the contract that is at the core of all these
provisions.  This proves surprisingly complex because to see the contract issues, one
has to untangle them from the conflict of laws issues.  That, in turn, requires at least
a summary understanding of the conflicts principles as well.
The Article will proceed in two main Parts and a short third one.  Part 1 will
introduce the provisions, begin to identify the contract issues that are beneath the
surface, and suggest why it is important to understand them more fully.  Part 2 will
then advance a simple methodology for approaching the provisions.  That Part will
conclude by showing how the methodology can help us understand an important,
recent case that raises many of the issues addressed here.  Finally, Part 3 will
conclude by suggesting that contracts scholars can and should play a far larger role in
the development of our understanding of these provisions.
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7.  See Patrick J. Borchers, The Internationalization of Contractual Conflicts Law, 28 Vand. J.
Transnat'l L. 421 (1995); Edith Friedler, Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory Solution to a Choice-of-Law
Problem, 37 U. Kan. L. Rev. 471, 475 (1989); and Friedrich K. Juenger, A Page of History, 35 Mercer L.
Rev. 419 (1981).
8.  Juenger, supra note 2, 558-59.
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Part I: The Contract Hidden in Contracts Choosing Law and Forum
Choice of Law Provisions
That the parties to a contract could dictate to a judge the law the court should
use to make a judicial decision seems counterintuitive and, perhaps, lawless.  It’s no
wonder, then, that the law has come to recognize this so-called “party autonomy”
only recently.  The history has been developed extensively elsewhere;7 a brief
summary here will suffice.  
The general background against which these contract provisions must be
understood is the legal subject area known as conflict of laws, a complex and, for
many, impenetrable tangle.  Early on in the development of conflict of laws
jurisprudence, long before widespread recognition of enforceable contract provisions
choosing law, there was comparatively little complexity:  courts originally proceeded
from the idea that the applicable law in a given case was, simply, the law of the
forum.  The problem this presented in the United States, with its many state
jurisdictions having differing views of appropriate legal norms, was forum shopping
and the possibility that the outcome of a dispute would be governed not by broad,
generally applicable legal principles but by the tactics of one party or the other in
bringing the litigation into a “favorable” jurisdiction.  
The classical conflict of laws system arose to neutralize this forum shopping.8
The conflicts rules that developed functioned as “pointers,”  ideally, pointing in a
determinate direction to the applicable substantive law once the facts at hand were
fed into the rule.  If the system worked in an optimal way, it would not matter where
a case were litigated because the conflicts rules everywhere would point to the same
applicable law. 
Of course, there were problems that caused reality to diverge from the ideal. 
First, many versions of these rules seemed sharp-edged but were, in fact, subject to
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9.  For example, would the “place of contracting” in an interstate contract depend on the
location of the offeror, the offeree, the place where the negotiation took place, or some other place? 
Cf. Eugene F. Scoles et al., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.14 (4th Ed. 2004).
10.  See, e.g., BRAINERD CURRIE, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict
of Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 128, 169 (1963) (advocating an interest
analysis approach to conflict-of-laws questions but admitting that Congress should pass legislation to
resolve conflicts that no conflict-of-laws method can resolve: that the forum often applies its own law
at the expense of another state’s interests); Juenger, supra note 2, at 559 (noting that the First
Restatement’s “rigid choice-of-law rules . . . did not prevent courts from indulging in home-town
justice” with the use of “escape devices--such as characterization, renvoi, and the public policy
reservation”); Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, International and
Domestic (Revisited), 37 Tex. Int'l L.J. 559, 564 (2002) (concluding that plaintiffs have the ability to
choose pro-recovery fora based on non-choice-of-law factors because of the malleable nature of most
state conflict systems).
11.  See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, The Need for a Comparative Approach to Choice-of-Law Problems,
73 Tul. L. Rev. 1309, 1316-17 (1999) (comparing the multilateralist and unilateralist approaches to
choice-of-law problems); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 320-22 (1990)
(rejecting both the First Restatement and the ad-hoc, case-by-case approaches and advocating the
development of canons to determine conflict-of-law questions based on shared policies among states);
Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of
Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 250-56 (1992) (approaching the conflict-of-laws question from a
constitutional standpoint).
12.  See Scoles et al., supra note 6, § 2.20; Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American
Courts in 2003: Seventeenth Annual Survey, 52 Am. J. Comp. L. 9, 26-7 (2004).
13.  304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
14.  Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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argument9 and those that were not sharp-edged, but required an exercise of judgment,
also suffered from indeterminancy.10 Which types of rules are better for the job
remains in dispute in the conflicts literature.11 Second,  as is typical in our Federal
system, not all States agreed on the same rules.12 Thus, a litigant could “shop” for a
State with a conflicts rule that would point to law that will favor the client’s case–a
more complicated reiteration of the original forum shopping problem the conflicts
system was designed to solve.  To exacerbate this problem, these State conflicts
principles must, following Erie,13 be applied by Federal courts sitting in given States.14 
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15.  See Laycock, supra note 11; Donald T. Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law, 70 Tex.
L. Rev. 1715 (1992).
16.  ALI International Judgment Recognition Project, supra note 4, Introduction: National Law in
the International Arena.
17.  It is very easy to recognize the predictive consequences of being able to choose law by
contract.  See Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 363,
403 (2003) (arguing that parties prefer choice-of-law clauses because they reduce both uncertainty
costs and the need for litigation). If such a provision is enforced, it eliminates litigation on the very
broad question of “what jurisdiction’s law controls the contract.”  
It is, however, very easy to overstate the benefits of eliminating this one issue in the context of
real litigation.  In that contentious setting, a choice of law clause could never be the panacea that some
assume.  An enforceable choice of law clause does not (and probably cannot) settle questions such as 1)
what legal regime within a jurisdiction will apply (e.g., U.C.C. Article 2A (true leases) or Article 9
(secured transactions) or U.C.C. Article 2 (goods) or general contract law (services)); 2) what rules will
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Calls to “federalize” the conflict of laws rules15 have gone largely unheeded, though
this same problem largely stands behind the American Law Institute’s project for a
Federal statute governing enforcement of international judgments.16
While this state of affairs presents serious problems for accident victims and
their defendants, it is worse when contracts give rise to the controversy.  This same
indeterminancy can upset finely-tuned calculations of risk and benefits engaged in by
those who do transactional work.  This is most likely to be true in negotiated
contracts between parties who both have much at stake in the deal.  The value of any
exchange is, in part, a function of the legal regime against which it is made.  If that
legal regime can be made to vary – long after the deal is struck, when a dispute has
developed –  through forum shopping, a party might lose – or win – benefits that were
not part of the deal that was made.  Whatever might be said of the need for a
determinate set of pointers that will not vary by jurisdiction in non-contract cases,
the need is considerably greater in negotiated contract cases when the value of the
exchange is, in part, determined by assumptions about the law that will apply to it.
There is thus a substantial economic case to be made for giving contracting
parties the ability to predict with greater accuracy the law that will apply to their
transaction.  Since the conflict of laws system cannot deliver that level of certainty,
the case for permitting the parties themselves to settle the matter through a contract
provision is great.17 What is surprising, historically, is that judicial recognition of the
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apply within that legal regime to the dispute (e.g., rejection versus revocation of acceptance in U.C.C.
Article 2); 3) how a trier of fact will see the facts; 4) who the judge will be and how she will interpret
the law; and 5) (most importantly) what the dispute will eventually be about.  Granted that
enforcement of a choice of law clause reduces some uncertainty about the outcome in a future dispute
(and thereby generates some economic value), in the context of litigation uncertainty, an enforceable
choice of law clause remedies only a small part of the uncertain future for a planner.
18.  See Joseph H. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 260, 260
(1910).
19.  See Mathias Reimann, Savigny's Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of the
Twentieth Century, 39 Va. J. Int'l L. 571, 575 (1999).  As will become evident, the image sketched by 
“party autonomy” becomes extremely unrealistic in settings where choice of law clauses are
promulgated en masse to customers.
20.  Joesph H. Beale, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1173 (1935).
21.  Reimann, supra note 19.  “Party autonomy” is something of a misnomer–parties have never
had unlimited power to bind the court to their particular choice of law.
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parties’ power (and need) to settle the applicable law by contract took so long to
develop.
It is clear that, despite the view that permitting parties to choose their law by
contract was permitting them to do a “legislative act,”18 the idea that party intent
ought to control the law to be applied to a contract had earned at least some judicial
recognition in the United States in the 19th Century19 and at least some academic
recognition by the 1930's.20 While the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws did not
recognize so-called “party autonomy,”21 courts increasingly accepted the idea and in
1952, Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code explicitly embraced contractual
choice of law as a matter of state statute.  U.C.C. § 1-105 provided that 
[W]hen a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also
to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of
this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and
duties.
It is very likely that codification of this “party autonomy” principle accelerated both
judicial recognition of contractual choice of law clauses and practitioners’ use of
them.  The development was finally  recognized in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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22.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971)(amended 1989)
provides:
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and
duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not
have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless
either 
 (a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction
and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
 (b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental
policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the
state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. 
23.  See Symeonides, supra note 12, at 28 (noting that 39 states have abandoned the lex loci
contractus rule with the majority of these states and a few others adopting the Restatement (Second)
Conflict of Laws § 187(2) approach).
24.  Comment b. to the provision reads:
b. Impropriety or mistake. A choice-of-law provision, like any other contractual
provision, will not be given effect if the consent of one of the parties to its inclusion in
the contract was obtained by improper means, such as by misrepresentation, duress, or
undue influence, or by mistake. Whether such consent was in fact obtained by improper means
or by mistake will be determined by the forum in accordance with its own legal principles. A factor
which the forum may consider is whether the choice-of-law provision is contained in an "adhesion"
contract, namely one that is drafted unilaterally by the dominant party and then presented on a
"take-it-or-leave-it" basis to the weaker party who has no real opportunity to bargain about its
terms. Such contracts are usually prepared in printed form, and frequently at least some of their
provisions are in extremely small print. Common examples are tickets of various kinds and
insurance policies. Choice-of-law provisions contained in such contracts are usually respected.
Nevertheless, the forum will scrutinize such contracts with care and will refuse to apply any
choice-of-law provision they may contain if to do so would result in substantial injustice to the
adherent. (emphasis supplied).
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CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 187 (hereinafter referred to as the “Conflicts Restatement”),22
a provision that a plurality of jurisdictions now follow,23 but which, when it was
developed, probably did not did not envision widespread enforcement of choice of
law clauses in consumer and small business adhesion contracts.24 
Whatever the Restatement’s drafters may have had in mind, the use of choice
of law clauses in consumer and small business settings carries similar advantages of
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25.  See generally Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract
Law, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 697 (1990).
26.  The decision is unavailable on Westlaw and is not in the Reporters.  But it appears in the
briefs of banks that cite it for the proposition that it is appropriate to use Delaware law to decide an
out-of-state unconscionability question.  How and why the decision (which the judge had already made
the effort to write) disappeared from the public domain, whether this is evidence of a far wider
phenomenon, and whether the phenomenon is one that structurally favors the repeat players through
some form of “private” reporting system is a topic for another day.
27.  No. CV 03-2801RBL (W.D. Wash. June 25, 2004).
28.  Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d 1249 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001).
29.  Sheifley, No. CV 03-2801RBL, at *4 (citing Edelist, 790 A.2d at 1261).
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certainty and predictability, particularly for the party who drafts the form.  What is
different is that their use there also raises problems that seriously threaten the
complex limitations on contracting that state legislatures and courts have set into
place to protect their residents against overreaching.25 A simple example of how this
might occur comes to us from an unreported decision26 involving an
unconscionability attack on an arbitration clause in the District Court in Tacoma,
Washington.
Sheifley v. Capitol One Bank27 was a class action suit where the court had before
it, among other things, the bank’s motion to stay the proceedings and compel
arbitration pursuant to a contract with the bank.  Ms. Sheifley sought to avoid the
arbitration provision on the grounds of unconscionability, in part, because the
arbitration clause also contained a class action waiver.  Unfortunately for Ms.
Sheifley, the form also contained a provision specifying that the law of Delaware
controlled the contract, and a Delaware court had concluded in an earlier case28 that
a class action waiver did not render an arbitration clause unconscionable under
Delaware law.   Judge Ronald Leighton used Delaware law to conclude that the class
action waiver before him was not unconscionable, acknowledging in the process that,
while the result might be different under Washington law, having agreed to Delaware
law, the plaintiff was bound by Delaware’s approach to unconscionability.29 
Since Delaware had already settled the unconscionability issue, it should be
obvious that a great deal rested on the choice of law clause.  As to that provision
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30.  Sheifley, No. CV 03-2801RBL, at *2-3.
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contained in the cardholder agreement, District Judge Ronald Leighton had only this
to say:
As an initial matter, the substantive law of Delaware governs this
dispute, including whether or not it must be arbitrated.  The cardholder
Agreement expressly so provides:
This agreement will be governed by the laws of the State of
Delaware and applicable federal laws.
Plaintiff does not directly (and as a practical matter, cannot) attack this
provision. . . . The court does not agree with plaintiff’s implicit claim that
Washington law must apply if it is more protective of consumer’s [sic] rights
than the law of the agreed upon state.30
There is thus no discussion in the case of how the choice of law clause was presented
to the plaintiff (and in particular, whether it was presented in such a way as to reduce
the likelihood it would be seen or read), the plaintiff’s understanding of the clause or
its implications, or any of the other questions that might ordinarily accompany a
challenge, on the basis of assent, to a clause in a contract.   In short, while it is clear
that the plaintiff was challenging whether she was bound by the arbitration
provisions of the agreement, her specific focus on whether she was bound by the
choice of Delaware law clause is not evident.  
Scheifley nicely illustrates two interrelated problems which, together, may
diminish the protection customers who live outside of Delaware would otherwise
have.  The first is the surprisingly difficult technical problem of applying both
contracts and conflict of laws principles.  There are a great many large credit card
banks located in Delaware.  It is very evident from the cases that banks have pressed,
with some measure of success, the applicability of Delaware law in out-of-state
litigation settings.  It is very clear from the cases that there is confusion over the
correct way to approach this threshold applicability issue.  
The second problem goes far beyond the parties to a dispute like Scheifley. It is
whether giving strong extraterritorial effect to the unconscionability decisions (or
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31.   See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 456-60 (2002) (describing the three doctrines currently used to
police contracts: unconscionability, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(3), and reasonable
expectations); Erin Ann O’Hara, Choice of Law for Internet Transactions: The Uneasy Case for Online
Consumer Protection, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1883, 1936 (2005) (arguing that substantive unconscionability
provides a sufficient policing tool for online contracts); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration,
Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration
Formalism, 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 757, 841-45 (2004) (advocating that courts increase their use
of the unconscionability doctrine for policing contracts).
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other important policy judgments in the consumer protection area) of one state
(through enforcement of choice of law provisions) is sound policy.  In this respect,
Judge Leighton’s use of Delaware’s unconscionability law in that Washington dispute
can stand as a surrogate for other kinds of consumer protection and Schiefley as a
metaphor.  
Many observers assert that unconscionability and similar doctrines are such
sufficient policing tools that there is no need for other rules.31 Whether this is true
or not, a State’s unconscionability cases and doctrine constitute a central feature of
its apparatus for protecting its consumers and small businesses -- perhaps as central or
“fundamental,” as a regulatory matter, as a State’s contract policy can get.  In
Scheifley, without much discussion, the court imported Delaware unconscionability
law and injected it into this controversy involving a resident of Washington.  In so
doing, the judge overrode whatever the Washington position on the matter might
have been.  Perhaps this was correct -- a main purpose of this article is to create a
better framework for judging the question -- but this Federal Judge owed to the
lawmakers and citizens of the State in which he sat (or at least to the parties) a better
explanation of why this should be so.  If a choice of law clause in an adhesion
contract can displace the otherwise-applicable unconscionability law in a given case,
little of a State’s other (and mostly less important) law protecting consumers and
small businesses is safe from this new form of adhesion contract waiver.  
Choice of Forum Provisions
Parties who actually negotiate choice of forum clauses are motivated by a
commercial need similar to that behind choice of law clauses, the main objective
probably being to reduce the unpredictable variables that could accompany a
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32.  Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 Cornell
Int'l L.J. 51, 51-2 (1992) (noting that choice-of-forum clauses create “orderliness and predictability in
contractual relationships”).
33.  See generally Juenger, supra note 2.
34.  See generally Scoles, et al., supra note 6, §§ 11.2-11.7.
35.  See, e.g., Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (holding that “agreements in advance
to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void”); Carbon Black Exp., Inc. v.
The SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958) (applying the “universally accepted rule that
agreements in advance of controversy whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts are contrary
to public policy and will not be enforced”); Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass’n. v. Cleveland Woolen Mills,
82 F. 508, 510 (6th Cir. 1897) (holding that a “provision intended to oust the jurisdiction of all state
courts is clearly invalid”); U.S. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 38 F.R.D. 418, 420 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (finding
that a contract clause may not “oust the courts of their jurisdiction”); Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co.,
72 Mass. 174, 184 (1856) (holding that “to allow them [jurisdictional rules] to be changed by the
agreement of parties would disturb the symmetry of the law”).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 reflects the history.  It provides:
The parties' agreement as to the place of the action cannot oust a state
of judicial jurisdiction, but such an agreement will be given effect
unless it is unfair or unreasonable.
36.  407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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contractual dispute.32 Here, too, there is probably a perception that some fora are
better than others for litigation33 and setting the forum within the contract will
reduce the natural–and costly–urge of one party or the other to “shop” for a forum
once a problem arises.  Though there is a superficial similarity to choice of law
clauses, the law behind choice of forum clauses has a different complexity.34 Here,
the hard non-contract law question is whether, under a given set of facts, a court that
would ordinarily have jurisdiction must refuse to exercise it if the parties have chosen
another jurisdiction as the exclusive forum for resolving their dispute.  
Until at least the 1950's, most courts refused to defer to the parties’ agreement
on the grounds that the parties lacked the power to “oust” the court of its own
jurisdiction.35 This changed dramatically with the Supreme Court’s decision in The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.36 holding that an exclusive forum chosen by the parties
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37.  The Bremen was a case where the forum was unrelated either to the parties or their
transaction and the underlying agreement arguably called for the application of unrelated law to the
contract.  407 U.S. 1, 13 n. 15.   See William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative
Choice in an Era of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. Rev. 697, 714-15 (2001).
38.  499 U.S. 585 (1991).
39.  Carnival Cruise, supra note 38, at 587.
40.  Id. at 593.
41.  Id. at 593-94.
42.  Id. at 594.
43.  Id. The Supreme Court did not reject the proposition that there was record evidence to
this effect, however.  Cf. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 389 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d 499
U.S. 585 (1991).
44.  Id.
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in an arms-length, negotiated agreement had to be enforced.37 With Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute,38 the Supreme Court applied the negotiated contract analysis in
the form contract setting and thereby delivered choice of forum clauses to the masses,
at least in admiralty settings.  
Carnival Cruise involved a personal injury on a cruise ship that traveled from
Los Angeles to Mexico and back.  Mrs. Shute had ordered and paid for the ticket in
Arlington, Washington; it was delivered with a clause specifying Florida as the
exclusive jurisdiction for litigating all disputes.39 The Supreme Court found that the
clause was enforceable and that the District Court in Washington properly dismissed
the case.  Justifying this decision, the Supreme Court noted that the cruise line had a
keen interest in keeping all its litigation in one place,40 that such a clause could
reduce uncertainty,41 and that passengers can actually benefit from such clauses in
the form of lower prices.42 Because there was no specific District Court finding of
fact, it rejected the Court of Appeals’ position that Mrs. Shute would be physically
and financially incapable of pursuing the litigation in Florida43 and may have implied
that one party’s business location in the selected forum is enough to defeat such a
showing in any event.44 Finally, the Court noted that “respondents have conceded
that they were given notice of the forum provision and, therefore, presumably
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45.  Id. at 595.
46.  See Scoles et al., supra note 6, § 11.5.
47.  See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts after Carnival
Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 55, 74-8 (1992); Jean Braucher, The Afterlife
of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 49, 62-7 (1995); Jeffrey A. Liesemer, Carnival’s Got the Fun . . . and the
Forum: A New Look at Choice-of-Forum Clauses and the Unconscionability Doctrine after Carnival Cruise Lines,
Inc. v. Shute, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1025, 1052-59 (1992); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More
Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 27 Tex. Int'l L.J. 323, 342-44 (1992).
48.  See Scoles et al., supra note 6, § 11.3 at 485; 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1998 O.J. © 27) 7-8; William W. Park, Illusion
and Reality in International Forum Selection, 30 Tex. Int'l L.J. 135, 188-91 (1995) (highlighting European
consumer protections with regard to the waiver of jurisdictional rights and noting that the United
States lacks similar protections).
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retained the option of rejecting the contract with impunity.”45
It is reasonably clear that because Carnival Cruise Lines was an admiralty case,
its analysis need not be adopted by State courts deciding whether they should
dismiss a case where an adhesion contract specifies a different exclusive forum.46 The
case has been roundly criticized47 and is at odds with the views expressed by
Europeans in international conventions that are far more protective of consumers.48
Choice of forum clauses in forms promulgated to consumers and small
businesses do not represent a collective effort on the part of the parties to reduce the
uncertainty of forum shopping; rather they reflect the drafter’s desire to prescribe
where the non-drafter might file suit.  While they are similarly adhesive, choice of
forum clauses pose a threat of a different character in this context from that which
accompanies choice of law clauses.  The obvious effect is that the enforceable choice
of forum clause commits the customer to a potentially distant jurisdiction either to
pursue or defend a claim. As suggested by Carnival Cruise, this might be a jurisdiction
where the form drafter is located, and has extensive business and legal ties.  Limiting
litigation to the forum chosen by the drafter will change the settlement value of the
case in the drafter’s favor, perhaps dramatically, whomever turns out to be the
plaintiff.  There are several implications.  
Unless the case is a large one or the “chosen” forum convenient, a choice of
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49.  See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products
Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 556 (1985) (stating that strict liability provides incentives for the
manufacturer to improve inspection for component defects).
50.  See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972) (stating that
the Hand Formula provides a quantifiable measure of the standard of reasonable care, which allows
individuals to adjust their level of care accordingly).
51.  See Braucher, supra note 47, 67-68.
52.  If all the competitors have the same provisions, then their price competition is based on
factors other than the clauses.  This could, theoretically, bring prices down generally but the reasons
would be based on a judgment that there is “too much liability” making the products too expensive as
a matter of public policy.  The most recent such judgment was made by Congress in the Protection of
Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, S. 397, 109th Cong. (as passed in the Senate, as amended, July 29,
2005); Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, H.R. 800, 109th Cong. (as reported in the House,
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given industries from liability require complicated policy (and political) tradeoffs and economic
judgments.  Making them on the basis of purported “agreement” by recipients of forms to the reduced
liability regime obscures and probably distorts sound policy analysis. 
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forum clause can eliminate a customer’s legal claim entirely.  Only in theory can a
customer make a cross-country trip to pursue a $100 warranty claim.   Moreover,
inasmuch as effective legal redress for either breach of contract or torts creates
incentives to product quality49 or to reasonable care,50 an enforceable choice of forum
clause can alter those incentives for the drafter by either reducing the real costs of
breach of contract or tort or eliminating them entirely.  This, of course, can result in
harm to other customers through breaches of contract or torts (or low quality
products and low levels of care) that would not have occurred had the law’s
incentives been optimal.  Finally, in the adhesive business form setting, one must
question whether the market in fact operates to deliver price savings to the
customer,51 an assumption made by the Supreme Court majority in Carnival Cruise
Lines. This depends on many factors, including strong competition among businesses
so that there might be some reflection of the business’s cost savings due to these
provisions in their prices.52 
The potential for a choice of forum clause to make litigation more expensive
might occur to at least some of those who actually saw and read a choice of forum
clause promulgated by a business.  In this sense, choice of forum clauses seem to act
in a somewhat more direct and potentially transparent way than do choice of law
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53.  See Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum
Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 700, 712 (1992). 
54.  See Braucher, supra note 47, 63-64.
55.  781 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.).
-18- Draft, August 15, 2005
clauses.   Even this may, however, be illusory.  While it would be difficult to come by
empirical proof, it seems likely that customers who receive choice of forum clauses
will be unaware of where they could bring a legal claim against the business absent
the clause, or of whether the business could obtain jurisdiction over them in a distant
place without the choice of forum clause.53 Moreover, it’s far more likely that the
main features of the contract–the product description, price, and other features–will
attract nearly all of their attention.54 Of course, in the unlikely event they read the
form, they might well understand that something is different given this clause and
that, perhaps, the difference runs in the business’ favor.  But any full understanding
of what a choice of forum clause means in rational choice terms is likely to be absent
from the vast run of people who receive forms. This may have bearing on the way one
views such clauses in contract terms.
Choice of forum clauses can have more subtle effects than the relatively
obvious one of transplanting litigation from a home forum to somewhere else.  Those
effects are not communicated by the text of a choice of forum clause.  The plaintiff in
America Online v. Booker55 brought a class action in Florida challenging AOL’s practice
of charging customers for the time they spent reading pop-up ads.  The service terms
promulgated by AOL contained both choice of law and choice of forum clauses
specifying a Virginia forum and Virginia law to be applied.  What the plaintiff or
other subscribers likely could not have known was that Virginia had no class action
device and, therefore, that AOL sought to remove, via its choice of forum clause, an
important procedural device for vindicating subscribers’ rights without even
mentioning it. 
As has been typical in these cases, the court did not address the contract
question–whether there was agreement–and simply proceeded to the Carnival Cruise
Lines part of the analysis:  assuming agreement, should the provision nonetheless be
unenforceable because it is unreasonable or unfair.  Note the pivotal rhetorical role
that the assumed agreement plays in the court’s justification of its decision:
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-19- Draft, August 15, 2005
Here, the forum selection provision was obtained through a freely
negotiated agreement which has not been shown by the plaintiffs to be
either unreasonable or unjust.   The unavailability of a class action
procedure in the transferee forum is not sufficient, standing alone, to
render an otherwise valid forum-selection clause unenforceable.   Florida
plaintiffs cannot defeat otherwise valid provisions requiring suit in other
states simply by asserting a cause of action in the name of a putative
class.56
The centrality of free contract ideology in this analysis suggests that modern contract
law itself may offer some promise to adherents in these settings.  
Part 2: Getting the Contract into the Analysis:  Working with Contractual
Choice of Law and Forum
The cases reflect confusion in the bench and bar about the approach one
should take when a choice of law or forum clause appears in an adhesive form.57 
Recognizing that the following structure is somewhat artificial, I advance it in the
hope that it can bring clarity to the legal complexity involved in working with these
clauses.  With that caveat, I suggest that the analysis in these cases entails a 3-Step
process–a conflicts analysis, followed by a contracts analysis, followed by a second
conflicts analysis.  For both choice of law and forum clauses (and for arbitration
clauses as well, with a slight modification) Step 1 assumes that a jurisdiction will
enforce some choice of law or forum provisions and asks a threshold conflicts
question:  which State’s contract law determines whether the parties in fact have a
contract for the specified law or forum.  Having determined in Step 1 which
jurisdiction’s law controls that contract, Step 2 focuses on whether the promulgated
provision is binding as a matter of contract law. Only when that question is answered
affirmatively should the analysis proceed to Step 3–are there principles other than
contract law principles that require that the potentially enforceable agreement found
in Step 2 not be enforced.  These steps are probably not independent of one
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58.  The majority and dissent in Carnival Cruise Lines illustrates this point.  The majority
seemed to assume contract formation and approached the case as one that was in the Bremen line of
cases (a predominantly conflict of laws analysis).  The dissent carefully looked at whether the parties
ought to be bound contractually–the implications of standard terms, inability to bargain over them,
etc. (a predominantly contract law analysis).  Obviously, the majority and dissenting opinions were
related. But it is hard to judge from the opinions whether they were aware they were talking about
separate aspects of the same problem that had different policy determinants.  I contend that more
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awareness that Carnival implicated both contract law policy and jurisdictional policy.
59.  The dynamics with non-exclusive choice of forum clauses are different because there is
not, in those cases, the direct conflict between the forum’s exercise of jurisdiction and the parties’
exercise of their will.  Put differently, exercise of jurisdiction by the forum is, in a non-exclusive case,
(obviously) consistent with the parties’ intent.  While such non-exclusive clauses can have commercial
utility, see Scoles et al., supra note 6, § 11.2 at 478, they are beyond the scope of the discussion here.
60.  The Bremen, supra note 36.
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another–contract law principles might properly inform and influence the conflicts
principles and vice versa–but to understand what is implicated doctrinally, it is useful
to treat them separately.58 A discussion using this simplified framework will serve as
a foundation for understanding the opportunities that contract law might provide in
this context and then for considering the difficult policy questions that are implicated
by widespread promulgation of these provisions.  
Because the structure is simpler, we will begin with choice of forum provisions. 
Champions of contractual choice of law and contractual choice of forum in
negotiated contract settings had to confront different obstacles in their efforts to
obtain legal recognition for them.  Traces of these obstacles are reflected in the
limitations the law has placed on these agreements. 
Choice of Forum Provisions–Domestic Limitations
The limitations on choice of forum agreements have historically proceeded
directly from the jurisdictional power exercised by courts.  Assuming jurisdiction over
a given matter, what effect should a private agreement of the parties to “exclusive
jurisdiction”59 elsewhere have on the forum’s exercise of that jurisdiction?  Courts
have moved, since the 1972 Bremen decision60 from outright hostility towards this
challenge to their power, to widespread deference to party intent and, no doubt, the
commercial utility of these clauses has played a role in their widespread recognition.
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But the proponents never succeeded in completely “ousting”61 the court’s preexisting
jurisdiction through their contractual acts of will:  there continue to be limitations
articulated by the Court in The Bremen and later in Carnival Cruise Lines making clear
that courts retain ultimate power to refuse enforcement of such agreements.  
What choice of forum provisions require, in addition to a contract law
analysis, is consideration of the forum’s jurisdictional power and of the potential
conflict between the forum court’s power and the private ordering policies behind
contract law.  Because choice of forum provisions create conflicts between presumed
party intent and the forum’s preexisting judicial power, it follows that the
reconciliation of this conflict is jurisdiction-specific.  Put differently, courts of
different jurisdictions can, in theory, have diverse views about the appropriate
balance between party autonomy and jurisdictional power.
Since it is the forum court’s judicial authority that is challenged by the parties’
choice of a different forum, the metes and bounds of party autonomy vis a vis the
forum must be set by the law of the forum.  But, assuming a given court allows some
agreements to “oust” it of jurisdiction, this need not necessarily mean that the contract
law governing whether the parties reached a permissible agreement should be the law
of the forum.62 The analysis developed earlier can help to clarify this.  
Consider this simple example involving three jurisdictions, the Forum, the
Relationship State63, and the Chosen State.  Suppose the parties make a contract that
contains within it a provision specifying Chosen State as the exclusive forum. 
Suppose further that among the jurisdictions that are connected to the contract,
Relationship State has such a great deal to do with the contract’s formation, parties,
and performance that we (and the parties) would normally imagine its law would
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-22- Draft, August 15, 2005
apply to control the parties’ dealings.  Finally, suppose that one party has disregarded
the choice of Chosen State clause and brought suit in the Forum, a State with enough
contacts that the court can exercise jurisdiction over the controversy.  In the analysis
suggested here, the court would first consider in Step 1 what State’s contract law
ought to determine the binding effect of the choice of forum clause.   Under these
facts, that law could be the law of Relationship State, at least if the likely frame of
reference of the parties is an important factor in the determination.64 Having done
that, the Forum court would proceed to analyze that provision under the applicable
contract law in Step 2.  If the forum found no binding contract under that State’s
law, it would exercise its jurisdiction over the case.  If it did find a binding contract,
the court would then proceed to Step 3 to consider whether Forum State’s own
policies ought to override the contract it found in Step 2
One might object that it is unduly complex (and artificial) to apply the forum’s
party autonomy override in Step 3, after finding a contract, rather than at the outset
in Step 1.  After all, if the jurisdiction imposes some limit to party autonomy to
choose an exclusive forum, why not simply assume a contract and face that question
at the outset?   Unfortunately, courts have done this all too often and, in the process,
have missed important norms from contract law that could contribute to the analysis. 
The 3 Step process, artificial as it might be, provides for a much richer analysis and a
greater awareness of the choices being made.  
Moreover, this more complex analysis gives the forum court an opportunity to
consider, when appropriate, the policy judgments of jurisdictions with a greater stake
in the controversy than the forum.  Suppose, for example, that Relationship State
validated virtually all adhesion contracts with very few exceptions and that Forum
State validated comparatively few of them.   At the threshold Step 1, the court could
use Relationship State’s law or Forum law to determine whether to enforce the choice
of forum.  An emphasis on the likely frame of reference of the parties would lead to
application of Relationship State’s law and recognition in Step 2 of the parties’
agreement to the choice of forum.  The forum would then consider in Step 3 whether
it should be overridden by Forum State’s policies.   If the Forum court chose not to
enforce the contract for the Chosen State forum, the expanded analysis makes it clear
that it would be on account of Forum State’s jurisdictional principles, not Forum
State’s contract principles.  
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Alternatively, the forum could apply forum law in Step 1 on the grounds that,
given the contract at issue, there was no collective frame of reference of the parties,
only the frame of reference of the drafter.  If that were the perception, applying the
law of Relationship State would be less compelling than before.  If the court found
forum law applicable in Step 1, it would refuse to find the choice of forum
enforceable as a matter of contract in Step 2 and there would be no need to go to
Step 3.  The grounds for denying enforcement would be the absence of agreement
rather than the conclusion that the forum’s policies were entitled to more weight
than Relationship State’s.
Thus, the more complicated analysis would make clear whether refusal of
enforcement were grounded in problems between the two parties or problems
between the will of the parties and the willingness of the court to bend to them.
While the court may have intuition that its refusal to enforce a choice of forum
provision is grounded in one reason or the other, we cannot know which it is without
a focus on which contract law is applicable in Step 1.65
It should be obvious that if a choice of law clause is included with a choice of
forum clause, the analysis gets far more complex, if not impenetrable.66 Even courts
that do an excellent job of analyzing the substantive issues may proceed to their
decisions without considering the conflicts policies that deserve attention even if,
ultimately, the agreement will be voided by the conflicts policies of the forum. 
The analysis in America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court,67 one of the few modern
cases that does not contain an arbitration clause, shows the potential complexity of
the issues.  This was a California class action brought by AOL customers under,
among other things, the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) claiming
Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum, and Arbitration
68.  As noted earlier, Virginia has no procedure for class action relief.  See supra text at note 55.
69.  America Online v. Booker, supra note 55.
70.  America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra note 67, at 5.
71.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971)
72.  Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 80 quoted supra in note 35.
-24- Draft, August 15, 2005
that AOL continued debiting their credit cards after they had terminated service. 
That Act gave consumers a right to seek class action relief and contained provisions
voiding waivers of its provisions as contrary to California public policy.  In the
underlying service terms, AOL had promulgated choice of law and forum provisions
designating Virginia as the applicable law and exclusive forum for disputes.  AOL
thus sought dismissal of the case pursuant to the choice of forum provision, a
potential death blow to the class action.68 In contrast to the approach in Booker,69 the
court in American Online v. Superior Court refused to enforce the contract provision,
reasoning that enforcement would amount to a waiver prohibited by California policy
and because enforcement would substantially diminish the consumers’ rights in
violation of California policy.70 
It should be obvious that, had the court applied Virginia law to the choice of
forum problem, the case could have gone the other way: it is scarcely possible that
Virginia law would refuse, on public policy grounds, to enforce a choice of forum
clause because the chosen forum (Virginia) lacked a class action procedure!  But
Virginia law could have applied to form a contract for Virginia forum–AOL was
located in Virginia and all of its customer contracts had that feature in common.  But
whether Virginia law was applicable to the choice of forum clause (Step 1) or formed
a contract for forum (Step 2), the California legislature, by enacting CLRA to protect
California residents, essentially stated an override that was applicable in the
California forum.  It is a basic conflict of laws tenet that a court “will follow a
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.”71
The Conflicts Restatement provision directs enforcement of a choice of forum
agreement “unless it is unfair or unreasonable.”72 This Step 3 language comes
directly from The Bremen where the court concluded that it was not “unfair, unjust, or
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unreasonable”73 to hold a party to the agreement, despite the substantial
inconvenience it might present.  The AOL v. Superior Court opinion is probably best
understood as either a specific articulation of this rule by a California court or as a
legislative addition to it (via the CLRA), as applicable by California courts, in Step 3. 
It doesn’t matter how the contract formed or under whose law, the legislature has
directed California not to yield their jurisdiction to party autonomy in these
situations.   
Carnival Cruise Lines, discussed earlier,74 gave meaning to the Conflicts
Restatement’s standard for choice of forum clauses appearing in cruise ship tickets
within Federal admiralty jurisdiction.  The majority decision is clearly striking a
balance between party autonomy and the power of Federal courts exercising
Admiralty jurisdiction – a Step 3 decision relying on The Bremen, another Step 3
decision.  But does Carnival Cruise Lines say anything useful about contract law and
the policies of freedom to contract and (in this context, more importantly) freedom
from contract underlying those policies?75 
That both majority and dissent were silent on whose contract law they were
interpreting is telling.  Was this the contract law of Washington, California, Florida,
or, indeed, was it some form of federal contract law applicable in Admiralty cases? 
All would be possible, but this lack of clarity in the applicable contract law makes it
even more plausible that Carnival Cruise Lines is simply not a contract case at all;
contract law was not at the core of the majority’s analysis.76 Rather, Carnival Cruise
Lines is a decision where assumed, abstract, and perhaps idealized, party autonomy
confronts the Federal admiralty courts’ exercise of their jurisdiction.  Even as to that
Step 3 question, its reach as a formal precedent is limited to Federal courts exercising
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admiralty jurisdiction.  But the analysis here suggests that its broader reach, as
stating a plausible view of contract policy (the Step 2 question), may also be quite
limited.
Both Carnival Cruise Lines and America Online help to underscore that an
important question in a choice of forum case–whether the provision is binding as a
matter of contract–is easily missed within a conflicts analysis.  Some commentators
have lamented contract law’s displacement of constitutional and jurisdictional
principles in this context.77 It’s no wonder: potentially robust contract law is
sandwiched within complex conflicts analysis where courts and commentators alike
assume there is agreement and proceed from there.  The very complexity of the
conflicts-contract-conflicts analysis might lead one to underutilize – and perhaps
underestimate – the State contract law devices that are actually available. 
Choice of Forum Provisions–Potential International Limitations
The importance of the contract law question, whether a choice of forum clause
is binding as a matter of contract, will become considerably more important if two
major lawmaking efforts currently underway evolve into rules that become binding on
courts.  Both would strengthen the importance of choice of forum clauses in
international settings.  In that sense, they make an understanding of the contract law
predicates to such agreements all the more important.  Both aim at the courts’
exercise of their power vis a vis party autonomy (i.e., Step 3); neither explicitly aims
to substantially change the analysis of the preceding (Step 2) contract law question.78 
Both suffer from a degree of opaqueness as to what jurisdiction’s contract law (Step
1) the forum ought to bring to bear in Step 2 on the choice of forum clause.
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79.  Special Commission on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters (Work. Doc. No. 110 Revised, April 21-27, 2004).
80.  See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, An Introduction to the Hague Convention, in A GLOBAL LAW OF
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 3, 3-13 (John J. Barcelo III & Kevin m.
Clermont eds., 2002) (detailing the Hague provisions); George A.L. Droz, Preliminary Draft of the
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters: Provisions of Jurisdiction, in
A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 15, 15-36 (John J.
Barcelo III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002) (detailing the Hague provisions); Matthew H. Alder, If
We Build It, Will They Come?–The Need for a Multilateral Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Civil Monetary Judgments, 26 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 79, 107-10 (1994) (describing the history of the
Hague Conference in the early 1990's); Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens
Analysis, 77 Tul. L. Rev 309, 381-83 (2002) (discussing the 1999 Draft Hague Convention and its
possible ramifications); Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New
Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1994, at 271, 271-73
(describing the early history of the Draft Hague Convention).
81.  Supra note 79, Article 2.  The current draft provides:
 1. The Convention shall not apply to exclusive choice of court agreements -
a) to which a natural person acting primarily for personal, family or household
purposes (a consumer) is a party . . . .
While this definition tracks the substance of the Uniform Commercial Code’s definition, see
U.C.C. § 1-201 (11)(2003 Revision), it is narrower than that of other countries that are would-be
parties to the Convention.  See, e.g., Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, art.
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The Hague Conference on Private International Law79 has a project underway that
would result in a Convention (hereinafter the Draft Hague Convention) requiring
parties to the treaty to enforce the “choice of court” agreements of one anothers’
citizens, and to enforce the judgments of courts chosen in “choice of court”
agreements.  The current effort is a remnant of a far more ambitious project that
would have called for mutual enforcement of treaty-state judgments.80 
An extended discussion of the Draft Hague Convention is beyond the scope of
this article.  But briefly stated, the objective has been to obtain widespread
international enforcement of choice of forum provisions and of the judgments that
result from proceedings consistent with them.  There are several aspects of the Draft
Hague Convention of interest here.  First, the Convention would exclude contracts
involving a narrowly-defined “consumer,”81 a subset of contracts far narrower than
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5, § 1, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 23 (defining a consumer contract as “a contract the object of which is the
supply of goods or services to a person...for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade
or profession, or a contract for the provision of credit for that object.”). The definition is also certainly
not coextensive with the range of adhesion contracts.  A dentist buying software for her practice is
functionally no different from a “consumer” when it comes to being bound by a click-to-agree choice of
forum clause contained within license terms that may or may not be available in advance.  See generally
Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market Concept and Its Lessons for Policing Standard
Form Contracts, 7 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 393 (2003).
82.  Supra note 79, Articles 5 and 7.
83.  Supra note 79, Article 7, notes 3 and 4.
84.  The American Law Institute Annual Proceedings May 16-18, 2005, http://www.ali.org
(follow “Annual Meeting” hyperlink; then follow “Actions Taken on 2005 Annual Meeting Drafts”
hyperlink).
85.  ALI International Judgment Recognition Project, supra note 4.
86.  See ALI International Judgment Recognition Project, supra note 4.
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“form” or “adhesion” contracts.  Second, it requires chosen courts to exercise
jurisdiction and, essentially, forbids unchosen courts from exercising the jurisdiction
they ordinarily would have;82 and third, it is at present indeterminate on the Step 1
analysis --  whose contract law will decide the question whether the choice of court
provision is binding or not.83 If the Convention becomes final and the United States
becomes a party to it, both choice of forum clauses (and, obviously, the contract law
governing their enforceability) will become more important than they are presently. 
The Convention would require State courts to limit their jurisdiction in Step 3 in
ways they might otherwise not be inclined to do.  
The second effort was recently concluded by a Drafting Committee of the
American Law Institute whose Project, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: 
Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute was ratified by the membership during its May,
2005 meeting.84 This Project is aimed at unifying, in the interests of international
trade, what is now a somewhat diverse State law approach to enforcement of foreign
judgments.85 If enacted, the Federal statute would preempt the Uniform Foreign
Money Judgment Recognitions Act, enacted in some 30 states.86 Section 5(b)(i)
provides, in part:
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87.  ALI International Judgment Recognition Project, supra note 4, § 5(b)(i) (emphasis
supplied).  Section 5(b)(ii) provides complex exceptions for the case where the proponent of the choice
of forum provision did not raise it in the “wrong” court and for the case where that proponent raised it
but lost in the “wrong” court.  In the latter case, the forum court’s determination that the choice of (a
different) forum provision was not binding is entitled to deference by the enforcing court in the United
States unless 1) that determination was “manifestly unreasonable” or 2) the original court rejects all
choice of forum agreements.  Id. § 5(b)(ii) and Comment f.
88.  UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(5), 13 U.L.A. 43 (2002).
89.  In this respect, it is the same as the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act
which does not provide for such exceptions either.  On the other hand, the Uniform statute was
promulgated long before Carnival Cruise Lines made clear that choice of forum clauses in adhesion
contracts might be enforceable.
90.  ALI Recognition and Enforcement Project, supra note 4, Comment f, states in part “If the
issue of validity of the forum-selection agreement was raised in the rendering court and that court has
held it to be inapplicable or invalid after contest, that determination is not ordinarily open to challenge
in a court in the United States . . . .”
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[A] foreign judgment shall not be recognized or enforced in a court in
the United States if the party resisting recognition or enforcement
establishes that the judgment resulted from a proceeding undertaken
contrary to an agreement under which the dispute was to be determined
exclusively in another forum.87 
Whereas the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act provides that a
court “need not” enforce a judgment entered in violation of a choice of forum
provision,88 the Project’s Draft makes denial of enforcement of the judgment 
virtually mandatory.  Moreover, unlike the Draft Hague Convention, the Project’s draft
does not exclude “consumers” or adhesion contracts from its scope.89
Comment f to the Project’s section 5(b) begs the Step 1 question of what
contract law the foreign forum court would apply in Step 2 to a choice of forum
clause.90 Once decided (on whatever basis), that foreign court’s decision is entitled to
substantial deference by the enforcing court in the United States.  The proposed
statute states Federal policy on the contest between party autonomy and State
jurisdiction and would thus change and unify the rules States now use in a version of
Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum, and Arbitration
91.  Since this Proposal aims to unify the diverse State law governing the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, its mandate would operate not on deferring to party autonomy in
choice of forum matters, but on deferring to it when that autonomy has matured into a foreign
judgment.   But, as with the choice of law and forum provisions that are the focus of this Article, the
prerequisite to applicability of the Project’s provision is a choice of forum agreement.  As always, it is
necessary to determine what law governs that contract question (Step 1) and what that law provides
under the given facts (Step 2).
92.  As likely as not, this deference is in the interests of furthering a policy of finality of
judgments.  It apparently makes no difference what jurisdiction’s contract law the French court applies
to the problem in Step 2.
93.  The informed French plaintiff might want to obtain a specific finding by the French court
that the choice of forum provision was not binding as a matter of French law.  Although the question
whether such a finding would later be recognized is an open question under the Project’s draft, such a
finding would surely complicate matters in the enforcing court.
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Step 3.91 The dynamics apparently change if the foreign judgment is rendered by
default.
To illustrate how the Project’s provision seems to work, suppose an American
business were sued by a customer in a French court on a contract that included a
choice of forum provision designating a United States forum.  Suppose further that
the business sought dismissal based on the choice of forum clause but the French
court refused to enforce the provision and later entered judgment against the
American business.  The Draft’s assumption seems to be that the French court will
apply its own contract law to the problem; the Draft Project suggests that deference
would be due to the French court’s ruling92 on the choice of forum clause and the
French judgment would be enforceable in the United States.  
Now suppose, instead, the same case where the American business were
properly within the jurisdiction of the French court and served with process, but
refused to appear (on the basis of the choice of forum clause) and thereby permitted
a default judgment to be entered against it.  Suppose further that the default
judgment eventually required enforcement in the United States.  Now, presumably
the enforcing court would be required to determine as an original matter93 whether
the choice of forum clause was binding.  
Which contract law would determine this question in the enforcing court?  No
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94.  Comment h states in part “If the judgment debtor failed to appear in the rendering court,
the issue of validity of the forum-selection agreement will be contested only in the court in the United
States.”  ALI International Judgment Recognition Project, supra note 4, comment h.
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answer emerges from either the Draft’s black letter or comments,94 and the Draft may
assume that the forum Court would apply its own contract law to the question if it
were to decide the case.  In both the forum and enforcing settings, the Draft thus
reflects inadequate attention to the preceding Step 1 conflict of laws question.  Once
there is a focus on Step 1, several possibilities emerge.  
The enforcing State court could apply its own contract law, it could use some
form of Federal contract law, or it could engage in a more nuanced conflicts analysis
that would consider the interests of France and the enforcing State in the contract
issues.  
The worst choice would probably be to apply the enforcing State’s own
contract law. A primary reason for the ALI Project is uniformity in enforcement of
judgments, but our contract law, particularly in adhesive settings, varies among
States.  Allowing this State-to-State diversity to work its way into the enforcement
mechanism would undercut the Project’s goal of uniformity because the foreigner’s
success in enforcing the default judgment would now depend on the diverse contract
law of the State where enforcement was sought.   The Federal common law approach
would be at odds with our history of leaving contract law to the States but would, at
least in theory, supply uniformity across the decisions on the question whether the
contract provision was enforceable (and therefore the default judgment not
enforceable).
The problem with both of these approaches is that they would generate
perverse forum shopping incentives.  American law–whether State or Federal–is
typically less protective of consumers than is European law.  This means that the
business will have good reason to sit out the French litigation and hope for a
favorable decision once the judgment comes here for enforcement.  Moreover, from
the conflict of laws perspective, both approaches might not supply appropriate
deference to the law of the State or Country having the best claim to govern the
transaction with its law.
This leaves a third approach – a Step 1 conflict of laws approach – which, from
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95.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 188 (1971).
96.  These incentives probably cannot be eliminated in this context.  Even under this third
system, one can imagine an American business balancing likely defeat in France against a shot that the
American court will misconstrue French law and find in its favor at the enforcement stage.  The
strategic incentives these examples suggest mean that foreign governments suspicious or hostile to
choice of forum clauses in consumer contracts will have to take more direct regulatory action against
American businesses doing business with their citizens.  Without such regulation, we could expect
many American businesses doing business abroad to include choice of (American) forum clauses in
their consumer contracts, keeping their assets out of the customer’s country, and not participating in
legal actions brought by the foreign customers.
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a policy perspective, might be the best.  At least in theory, if all jurisdictions agreed
in Step 1 that the governing law should be that with the most substantial
relationship with the transaction,95 then the same law would apply in all courts in the
US and in French courts, the Project’s goals of uniformity in enforcement would be
met, and the incentives for forum shopping would be reduced.96 The problem we face
with this solution is an old pervasive one:  conflict of laws is State law and, as such, it
varies from State to State.  This means that the Step 1 rules might not, even in
theory, point at the same applicable contract law and that, therefore, inconsistency in
enforcement is again a problem.  Moreover, while this third approach may be
attractive at the theoretical level, it is sufficiently complex that it might well elude
predictability.
Had the Project considered the contract law questions implicated in Step 2, it
might have considered the conflicts questions that naturally precede those contract
questions in Step 1.  It could have specified the application of some version of
Federal contract law in this situation or it could have stated a uniform conflict of
laws rule for the States to follow in pursuing the more nuanced Step 1 conflicts
analysis.  Unless the Draft is revised or commentary added to it before it goes to
Congress, we will have to await judicial decisions that, hopefully, will make clear the
contract law that they are applying in Step 2 and the (Step 1) reasons that law
should be applied.
The Special Case of Arbitration
Arbitration clauses present a special kind of choice of forum clause and, at first
blush, one might expect them to be governed by similar principles.  Early on, they
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97.  See, e.g., Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1868) (finding that an
agreement to arbitrate “is held invalid, because it is an attempt to oust the courts of jurisdiction by
excluding the assured from all resort to them for his remedy”); Reed v. Wash. Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
138 Mass. 572, 575 (1885) (noting that an agreement to arbitrate will not be enforced because it
“would oust the courts of their jurisdiction”); Mach. Prods. Co., Inc. v. Prairie Local Lodge No. 1538
of Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, A.F.L.-C.I.O., 94 So. 2d 344, 348 (Miss. 1957) (holding a pre-dispute
agreement to arbitrate voidable by either party because “private persons cannot . . . oust the
jurisdiction of the legally constituted courts”); Riley v. Jarvis, 26 S.E. 366, 367-68 (W. Va. 1896)
(noting that “parties could not, by agreement, oust the courts of the jurisdiction assigned them by
law”).
98.  See cases, supra at note 97.
99.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
100.  The cases are legion reiterating a strong federal policy favoring arbitration in situations
where a claimant is attempting to avoid a contractual arbitration clause in a judicial forum.  For
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were: like contract provisions calling for a different forum, arbitration clauses were
seen by forum courts as attempts to “oust” the court of jurisdiction.97 As such, the
question was one of resolving the conflict between the forum’s power and the private
parties’ power to “oust” it, the traditional conflicts inquiry in which collective party
autonomy confronts the jurisdiction’s power.98
The Federal Arbitration Act, enacted in 1923, changed all that.  Section 2
provides:
A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.99
This converts what was an analysis focused on the conflict between the private
ordering (reflected in the choice of forum clause) and the court’s own jurisdictional
power, into a simpler analysis that has removed the forum court’s inherent power
from the analysis.  It should be evident that the FAA addressed -- and may have
simply eliminated -- the Step 3 analysis.  But notwithstanding the strong federal
policy favoring arbitration100 enforced even in settings where the issues entail
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representational samplings, see Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 637, 638 (1996); Richard E. Speidel,
Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute (Mandatory) Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40
Ariz. L. Rev. 1069, 1071 (1998).
101.  Many have thought that these issues were inappropriate for an arbitrator’s decision. 
Perhaps the most important such case–and one that laid the foundation for the many that followed– 
was Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) where the Supreme
Court required an American company’s federal antitrust claim against a Japanese company to be heard
by Japanese arbitrators.  Mitsubishi involved an arbitration clause that was part of a negotiated
contract.  Such issues in the adhesion contract arena include claims of age discrimination in
employment, see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Truth in Lending, see,
e.g., Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2002); claims of employment
discrimination in the brokerage industry, see, e.g., Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
957 F. Supp. 1460, 1470 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
102.  Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr.2d 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) illustrates the
contract analysis, uncomplicated either by a choice of law clause or the possibility of a different State’s
law applying to the contract.  The question was whether an obligation to proceed with arbitration
arose from the bank’s forms.  Finding that the arbitration clause was delivered by a “bill stuffer” after
the accounts arose and were not properly parts of the underlying relationship, the court rejected the
proposition that there was a contractual agreement to arbitrate.  Compare Edelist v. MBNA, discussed
infra beginning at note 112.
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important public policy issues,101 the threshold question whether the challenging
party is bound as a matter of State contract law survives.102 This implicates the Step 1
question: which State’s contract law?  The cases reflect confusion about that question,
particularly when the inquiry is complicated by a choice of law clause within the
same set of terms.  
Choice of Law Provisions
Choice of law clauses bring with them far more potential for confusion than do
choice of forum provisions.  They may, of course, be binding terms of a contractual
relationship arising under some jurisdiction’s contract law.  But layered on top of the
Step 2 contract analysis, there are complex, potentially restrictive conflict of laws
principles.  Perhaps this complexity accounts for the fact that parties and courts
usually fail to focus on the Step 2 contract law question (and, inevitably, on the Step
1 which-contract-law question) and, almost invariably, assume that the choice of law
clause is binding as a matter of contract law. Courts, and apparently parties, take this
leap of faith in virtually all circumstances, including adhesion contracts involving
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103.  U.C.C. § 1-105 (pre-2003 revision).
104.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, quoted supra in note 22.
105.  See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12 (“The choice of that forum was made in an arm's-length
negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen, and absent some compelling and
countervailing reason it should be honored by the parties and enforced by the courts.”); Stewart Org.,
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1069 (11th Cir., 1987) (citing The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.);
Commerce Consultants Int’l, Inc. v. Vetrerie Riunite, S.p.A., 867 F.2d 697, 699-700 (D.C. Cir., 1989)
(citing The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.).
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consumers and small businesses where the dynamics of the situation and the contract
law that applies to it might be very different.
Beyond that, the choice of law cases also reflect missed opportunities and lack
of understanding at the third stage of analysis, the stage where one would consider
whether a choice of law provision, already found binding under applicable contract
law, may nonetheless be unenforceable because of conflict of laws principles that
limit such contractual terms. 
We may be at this underdeveloped and confused stage because of the peculiar
way the law governing choice of law clauses developed.  As indicated above, choice of
law clauses were largely unenforceable before the 1950's and the limitations on those
provisions came not from contract law but from conflict of laws jurisprudence.  The
recognition that such clauses served valuable commercial needs eventually produced a
relaxation of restrictions, but how those restrictions would be relaxed and what
limitations would remain continued to be conflict of laws questions.  Although the
1952 U.C.C. provision permitting the parties to choose the applicable law was not
very complex,103 the analogous RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
provision104 was loaded with interesting issues.  Thus, the pressure to recognize such
clauses was coming from commercial interests, but the thinking that was triggered by
this newly-recognized commercial need was occurring in the conflicts field.  
Moreover, the early paradigm cases which made “news” on contractual choice
of law issues were large, negotiated cases where there would be little doubt that an
agreement, enforceable under applicable contract law, had been made.105 Thus, there
was little new material for contracts scholars to think about – the developments
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106.  One very early work in this area is Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict
of Laws, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 1072 (1953), published just ten years after Frederick Kessler did his
pioneering work on the adhesion contract.  Frederick Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion–Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1943).  Professor Ehrenzweig expressed considerable
skepticism about the propriety of enforcing choice of law clauses in adhesion contracts.
107.  Comment b to Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law, § 187 states, in part:
A factor which the forum may consider is whether the choice-of-law provision is
contained in an "adhesion" contract, namely one that is drafted unilaterally by the
dominant party and then presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis to the weaker party
who has no real opportunity to bargain about its terms. Such contracts are usually
prepared in printed form, and frequently at least some of their provisions are in
extremely small print. Common examples are tickets of various kinds and insurance
policies. Choice-of-law provisions contained in such contracts are usually respected.
Nevertheless, the forum will scrutinize such contracts with care and will refuse to apply
any choice-of-law provision they may contain if to do so would result in substantial
injustice to the adherent.
108.  The provision is quoted, supra note 22.
109.  834 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1992).
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might well have been perceived and conceived of as purely conflicts developments.106 
The focus on these clauses in litigated consumer cases is a very recent
phenomenon and it may well be that the habit of not asking contract questions about
choice of law clauses might have generated a kind of inertia when those clauses began
appearing in litigated adhesion contract cases.  Tellingly, a caveat in a Comment to
the Restatement provision suggests that choice of law provisions in adhesion
contracts might be treated differently from those in negotiated contracts107 but that
opening seems to have fallen on deaf ears.
The Conflict of Laws Principles that Limit the Otherwise-enforceable Contract-for-Law
The conflict of laws principles, contained in the Conflicts Restatement108 are
extraordinarily cumbersome and nuanced but reasonably well-known.  The
methodology under the Restatement provision is succinctly expressed by the
California court in Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court:109
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110.  Id. at 1152 (footnotes omitted and emphasis supplied).
111.  Scoles et al. refer to this possibility as raising serious “bootstrapping” problems.  Scoles et
al., supra note 6, § 18.2 at 956.  
112.  Edelist, 790 A.2d 1249.
-37- Draft, August 15, 2005
Briefly restated, the proper approach under Restatement section 187,
subdivision (2) is for the court first to determine either:  (1) whether the
chosen state has a substantial relationship to the parties or their
transaction, or (2) whether there is any other reasonable basis for the
parties' choice of law. If neither of these tests is met, that is the end of
the inquiry, and the court need not enforce the parties' choice of law.  If,
however, either test is met, the court must next determine whether the
chosen state's law is contrary to a fundamental policy of California.  If
there is no such conflict, the court shall enforce the parties' choice of
law.   If, however, there is a fundamental conflict with California law,
the court must then determine whether California has a "materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the
particular issue...."  (Rest., § 187, subd. (2).)  If California has a
materially greater interest than the chosen state, the choice of law shall
not be enforced, for the obvious reason that in such circumstance we
will decline to enforce a law contrary to this state's fundamental
policy.110 
As the provision, and the court’s explanation make clear, the restrictions expressed in
the Restatement operate only at Step 3, after the court has determined that the State
is a “chosen state” and that the clause represents the “parties’ choice of law.”  Those
conclusions are predicated on the contract analysis that is not articulated and is
probably not present in the cases.   Moreover, when a court faces the contract law
question whether to enforce a choice of law clause either in a negotiated contract or
in a promulgated business form, it must first decide whose contract law to apply to the
problem.  A court has to start somewhere and, if the question at hand is whether a
party agreed to be bound by chosen law, that chosen law itself cannot be brought to
bear on the question111 unless, of course, it would apply absent the contract choice of
law clause at issue.  
Edelist v. MBNA112 illustrates the approach many courts take, one that reflects
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113.  See, e.g., Mackey v. MBNA Am. Bank, 343 F.Supp 2d 966, 968-69 (W.D. Wash. 2004)
(no express class action waiver in arbitration clause); Lloyd v. MBNA Am. Bank, No. Civ.A.
00-109-SLR, 2001 WL 194300, at *1-2 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2001) (opinion does not contain the entire
credit card agreement-only arbitration clause and class action waiver included); Discover Bank v.
Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76 (Cal. 2005) (no express Delaware choice-of-forum clause).
114.  Edelist, supra note 28, at 1252-53.  The choice of Delaware as a litigation forum was,
apparently, superseded by the arbitration clause and class action waiver.  While it is unclear from the
opinion why the plaintiff brought the case in Delaware, the plaintiff’s theory was that the bill stuffer
was ineffective to amend the agreement.  If that were true, then the choice of the Delaware forum
clause would remain.  Whatever the reason, bringing the case in Delaware was, it turned out, fatal to
the claim both on the merits and from a conflict of laws perspective.  As the text will develop, the case
illustrates the centrality of choice of forum in a conflict of laws analysis and, in this context, to success
in an unconscionability challenge.
115.  This term makes its appearance in the earlier California case, Badie v. Bank of America, 79
Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
116.  Edelist, 790 A.2d at 1254.
117.  Once the court concluded its conflict of laws analysis, it applied these precedents to find
against the plaintiff.  Edelist, 790 A.2d at 1260-61.
118.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 188(a) (1971).
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confusion over Steps 1 and 2 and rests largely on the conflict of laws restrictions. 
Edelist was a class action brought by a California resident in Delaware seeking
damages for breach of the underlying contract.  The bank’s form contained each of
the big three clauses that make their way into credit card cases:113 an arbitration
clause, a class action waiver, and a choice of Delaware as the exclusive forum114 and
this legal package was delivered via “bill stuffer”115 to the plaintiff.116 The form also
specified Delaware law as the governing body of law and Delaware had precedent
suggesting that neither arbitration clauses nor class action waivers in adhesion
contracts with consumers were unconscionable.117
The court began with the Conflicts Restatement’s Section 188, a provision
that a forum might begin with in the absence of a choice of law by the parties. 
Briefly stated, that provision “points” to the law of the State with the most
significant relationship to the transaction and parties.118 After looking at the
respective relationships between California and the plaintiff on one hand and
Delaware and the Bank on the other, the court cited two Delaware cases for the
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119.  Edelist, 790 A.2d at 1256.
120.  For example, Delaware makes “bill stuffers” binding as a matter of Delaware contract law by
legislation.  See 5 Del.C. § 952 (2005) which provides:
Any notice of an amendment sent by the bank may be included in the same envelope with a
periodic statement or as part of the periodic statement or in other materials sent to the borrower.
Compare Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr.2d 273 (Cal. App. Ct. 1998).
121.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b (1989).  The provision is
quoted supra in note 24.
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proposition that "Delaware courts will honor specific choice of law provisions so long
as there is some material linkage between the chosen jurisdiction and the
transaction."119 With that the court concluded that, by the parties’ agreement,
Delaware law controlled the dispute.
The articulated Delaware rule that Restatement Section 188 pointed to was
the substance of the Restatement’s Section 187(2) (that the parties could choose law
that was “related”).  Under that provision, there is no doubt that the Edelist parties
could have contracted for the law either of California or of Delaware and a court,
following that provision, would have enforced the agreement in Step 3.   But this
begs the questions, 1) did they so agree and 2) under what State’s contract law did
they do so?  Presumably, it was Delaware contract law because the conflicts principle
in Section 188 would have pointed to that law if, as the court may have silently
concluded, Delaware had the most significant contacts with the parties and
transaction.   While there was no explicit focus on the restrictions Delaware contract
law might have erected to a binding choice of law agreement in this context, had the
court engaged in such an analysis, it would probably have found few obstacles under
Delaware law in this banking context.120 
While this part of the opinion suffers from murkiness, the court reached its
result perhaps in a more complicated way than contemplated under the Conflicts
Restatement.  Section 187, the provision addressing contractual choice of law
questions, contemplates that the forum court will apply the forum’s contract law to
resolve the threshold question, whether the agreement to the choice of law is
enforceable.121 In Edelist, because the forum was Delaware, its law was the
appropriate contract law to begin the inquiry under the Restatement provision.  
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122.  Cf. Scoles, supra note 6, PINPOINT CITE
123.  Compare Scoles et al., supra note 6, § 18.2 at 955. 
124.  30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76 (Cal. 2005).
125.  The alleged practice was a representation by the bank that late fees would not be
assessed if payment were received by a certain date but charging late fees if the payment was received
after 1:00 p.m. on that specified date.  Id. at 78.
126.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 2511-2527 (1999); Discover Bank, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 80.
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The Restatement’s position on whose contract law to begin with -- forum law --
is at odds with the more complicated analysis imagined in Edelist. The Restatement’s 
approach may be predicated on a view that in contested contract formation settings,
there is no collective legal frame of reference for “the contract” (a “substantial
relationship” State), since one side maintains there is no contract.122 In these
circumstances, forum law may have as good a claim to govern the situation as would
the law to which Section 188 might point.  Moreover, the Restatement’s approach is
far simpler and more determinate than is that which the Edelist court might have been
using, and simplicity and predictability may be good reasons to embrace it.123 But the
tradeoff is that, partly because it is so determinate, this approach offers forum
shopping opportunities that the conflict of laws system is designed to minimize.  One
could imagine courts in some States developing a contract law analysis that is more
sensitive than that of other States to the implications of choice of law clauses in
adhesion contracts.  If the litigation lands in those States, its courts might refuse to
enforce choice of law clauses, at least in some instances of perceived customer
injustice.  We have just that possibility crystallized – but not resolved – in an
important recent California Supreme Court case.  It can serve to illustrate how the
contracts and conflicts principles might work together in a very difficult setting.
Some of the Conflicts (and Contracts?) Ideas at Work
Discover Bank v. Superior Court124 was a class action brought by consumers in
California against the bank arising out of a bank practice alleged to be deceptive125
under the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act.126 The bank sought arbitration pursuant to
the mandatory arbitration provision in its forms, and these forms, as usual, included
a class action waiver, and a clause specifying Delaware law as the controlling law for
the relationship.  In the appeal to the California Supreme Court, the customers
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127.  While the plaintiffs maintained that the class action waiver was invalid under California
law, they were careful to maintain their reliance on Delaware law for their challenge to the substance of
the bank’s practice.  Id. at 85, n. 2.
128.  Id. 86-95.
129.  Id. at 96-97.
-41- Draft, August 15, 2005
challenged the class action waiver as unconscionable under California law127 and
sought class-wide arbitration of their claims.  While much of the opinion was
addressed to the court’s conclusion that California law on the question before it was
not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act,128 the Court eventually concluded that
California law rendered the class action waiver unenforceable in this context and that
class-wide arbitration would be ordered.  But all of this was contingent on an
assumption: that the Delaware choice of law provisions did not displace the court’s
use of California law in this context.  It remanded that pivotal question – the effect of
the choice of law clause – to the trial court.129 
A bird’s-eye view of Discover Bank shows an intractable issue of federalism
which will not likely be fully resolved on remand.  One side of the issue is made
possible by the widespread enforcement of choice of law provisions in consumer
contracts:  can a State’s businesses, through choice of law clauses in their businesses’
forms, project their (that is, their chosen State’s) view of consumer protection into
the other 49 States.  Upholding the Delaware choice of law provision and Delaware’s
concomitant validation of class action waivers would effect such a result in California. 
The flip-side of that question is focused by the unusual way Discover Bank was framed
by the plaintiffs–Delaware law for regulating the Bank’s conduct, California law for
regulating the class action waiver:  can California customers, via California law,
potentially applicable in the first instance to (or operable in spite of) these same
contractual choice of law provisions, project their (California’s) view of consumer
protection from class action waivers into other States via a nationwide class action?  
The class action side of this problem has a very short half-life:  California’s
ability to project its class action policy is coextensive with consumers’ ability to
maintain nationwide state class actions.  In view of recent Federal legislation,
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130.  See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (to be codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711-1715).  Discover Bank was not affected because the new law operates
only prospectively.  Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 9, 119 Stat. 4, 14.
131.  Justice Baxter agreed with the majority that the Federal Arbitration Act did not preempt
California law in this case, if it applied, which he believed it did not.
132.  Discover Bank, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 97.
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consumers’ ability to maintain such class actions has probably come to an end.130 
Choice of law clauses in adhesion contracts are, on the other hand, not likely
to disappear soon and we can expect businesses ever more aggressively to argue that
such provisions displace the State law of “unchosen” States that ordinarily would
protect consumers.  Moreover, in the current environment of widespread consumer
arbitration, the effects of inadequately addressed choice of law clauses could be
multiplied: arbitrators will “follow” the law, not “develop” it as common law courts
have for centuries.  If judicial precedent on these issues will, effectively, be “frozen,”
the precedential cases ought to be soundly reasoned and take account of all the issues
triggered by choice of law clauses in business forms.
 
The concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Baxter131 underscores the
importance of the contract law underpinning that, at least in the first instance, lies
behind the federalism question.  Justice Baxter apparently thought that Delaware law
controlled, primarily because of the choice of law clause, and that, therefore, the case
was an inappropriate vehicle for articulating California law on class action waivers.132 
Some of his rhetoric imagines a bargain in these adhesion contracts that, in the
context of choice of law clauses in particular, is nearly breathtaking:
Here, the parties gave extensive and detailed contractual consideration
to the “issues that would arise . . . if litigation [became] necessary.” 
They specifically agreed that disputes would be resolved, upon either
party’s election, by mandatory arbitration, and that class treatment of
the dispute would not be permitted.  Further, they expressly provided
that their agreement would be governed by the law of Delaware–a
jurisdiction which, for policy reasons of its own, allows contractual
provisions requiring nonclass arbitration . . . .The reasonable
expectations of both Discover Bank and the State of Delaware [sic]
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133.  Id. at 104.  The supposedly contractual relationship was between Discover Bank and the
cardholders, not between the Bank and Delaware.  That relationship was not at the core of this dispute
between the bank and its customers.  
134.  Discover Bank at 96 (majority) & at 101 (dissent).
135.  See supra text at note 123.
136.  See Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 854 P. 2d 1148 (Cal. 1992) discussed supra
note 109.
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would thus be “unfairly disappointed” if a California rule banning class
waivers were applied despite the parties’ agreement.133
Surely, one could take some comfort with the applicability of Delaware law to
the consumer protection problems if one thought that there were a full, knowing
waiver of the California consumer protection law as the dissent seems to imply.  But
the possibility of such a knowing waiver, even through a far more robust provision
than the terse sentence in the bank’s bill-stuffer form, seems extremely far-fetched. 
Moreover, the dissent’s idealized freedom-of-contract rhetoric should underscore that
the opening questions on remand in Discover Bank are contract law questions and, to
reach them, the court first has to decide what State’s law should control them.  
As superb as they are in focusing the larger issues, the Discover Bank’s majority
and dissenting opinions both reach beyond these threshold questions to the conflicts
questions such as whether, given agreement to the choice of law clause, enforcement
might violate California’s fundamental policy.134 A richer, more informed analysis
entails a consideration of the threshold questions that precede the conflicts analysis,
whether the parties agreed, as a matter of contract, to the choice of law provision and
the preceding conflicts question, under what jurisdiction’s law should the contract
question be resolved.
As to that threshold conflict of laws question, the Restatement calls for the
forum to apply its own contract law to the contract question135 and California has
embraced the Restatement provision as a general matter.136 Edelist and cases like it
may call for the contract law to which the forum’s conflict of laws principles point. 
Once the applicable contract law is found, the court will proceed to Step 2 and
determine if the contract provision is binding under that law.  Here, contract
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137.  Discover Bank at 96 (majority) & at 103(dissent).
138.  See Scoles et al., supra note 6, § 3.8 at 128 (4th Ed. 2004) (stating that courts will rely
on forum law to deal with “procedural” aspects of litigation); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of
Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291,
296 (1988) (stating that contractual choice of forum is effectively a choice of procedures by the
parties); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971) (providing that “[a] court
usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how litigation shall be conducted even when it
applies the local law rules of another state to resolve other issues in the case.”).
139.  See Linda S. Mullenix,  Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 291, 296-97 (1988) (advocating for a more
procedural based analysis when analyzing forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses as opposed to the
current method based on contract law).
140.  As articulated in the text, this would primarily be a conflicts question, do the parties
collectively have the power through their contract to alter the preexisting civil procedure rules of the
forum?  In the analysis developed in this Article, this question would come at Step 3 as an override to
a valid contract found through Steps 1 and 2 under applicable contract law.  Much of the majority’s
analysis in Discover Bank would, by contrast, be better characterized as animated by contract law: does
one party, through its business form, have the power to bind the other to a class action waiver.
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formation (e.g., are provisions promulgated via bill stuffers binding),
unconscionability (e.g., is a choice of law in a business form that reduces consumer
protection, at least without spelling out that fact, unconscionable), and the other rich
tools of contract law can be fully deployed.  If (and only if) the choice of law is
enforceable under the appropriate State’s contract law should the court reach the
Step 3 conflict of laws question, whether California public policy should nonetheless
override the agreement.
As recognized by both majority and dissent,137 Discover Bank may trigger an
alternate analysis, one that could prove useful to the plaintiffs in the case.  Matters of
procedure have always been the domain of the forum and subject to forum law.138 
Indeed, it is hard to imagine a reason not to apply the forum’s law to a question of
procedure since it directly implicates the power of the forum court to process disputes
in the way its system has been designed.139 If the Discover Bank matter is perceived
as procedural–can an out-of-state bank’s promulgated form limit the range of civil
procedure a forum can engage in, then California will apply its own law to the
question.140 This could well be the right way to understand the problem:  a number
of courts that have sustained class action waivers over unconscionability attacks have
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141.  See, e.g., Lloyd v. MBNA Am. Bank, 27 F. App’x 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that an
arbitration agreement barring classwide relief is not unconscionable because class actions are “merely”
a procedural right); Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that an
arbitration clause that may render class actions unavailable is enforceable because class actions are
“merely” a procedural right); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 926-27 (N.D.
2005) (finding that a “no class action” provision is not unconscionable because class actions are
“purely” a procedural right).
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done so by maintaining that class actions are “mere” procedural devices, not matters
of substance, and therefore provisions waiving them are not of such moment to
trigger an unconscionability conclusion.141
Part 3: Conclusions–The Future of Contracts for Law, Forum, and Arbitration
For negotiated contracts, the future of contracts for law, forum, and arbitration
is bright.  The provisions make contract litigation more predictable and thereby add
value to the underlying transactions.  In international contracts particularly, such
provisions are probably essential to a competently drafted contract.  At this point in
our economic development, such provisions are largely uncontroversial.
When these provisions appear on business forms distributed to customers,
however, it is another story.  Once again, Discover Bank is a good illustration in the
context of choice of law.  If one takes much of the Discover Bank’s dissent at face
value, the bank’s simple insertion of a choice of (Delaware) law clause in the
customers’ forms did (or ought to) transform what would have been an inquiry into
unconscionability under California law into one under Delaware law where, as the
dissent pointed out, class action waivers have been sustained.  What is impermissible
under California law becomes permissible if the bank simply adds a choice of
Delaware law sentence to the form.
While the underlying issues and doctrine may be complex and elusive, most
bystanders would probably consider this to be drafting slight-of-hand or even legal
chicanery.  We begin with a provision that is probably unenforceable in the
customer’s home state (say a class action waiver), and the home state’s law says or
implies that a waiver of the home state’s protection is unenforceable.  Direct waiver
by form contract of the class action remedy being unavailable, the business instead
finds and chooses a State’s law that sees things the other way and promulgates that
law through the form.  Abracadabra!  Without even mentioning the word “waiver” or
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142.  But see Radin, supra note 1.
143.  See, e.g., Bohan v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 366 F.3d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 2004); Lloyd v.
MBNA Am. Bank, 27 F. App’x 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2002); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr.
3d 76, 97 (Cal. 2005) (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
144.  Scheifley, No. CV 03-2801RBL.
145.  See e.g., Arthur Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 Am. U. L. Rev. 131 (1970).
146.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(3) and UCC § 2-207 are two exceptions. 
Together they offer strong evidence of the law’s failure here.
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“class action,” the business has converted a losing case into a winner, an almost-
amazing result that probably does neither the law nor the reputation of lawyers any
good.  As long as contract law remains a system where obligation is imposed on the
basis of assent,142 such a result should raise some questions.
But, as is evident from the cases that either the claimant concedes the
application of the specified law,143 or, as in Scheifley,144 the court concludes there was
agreement, as a matter of contract, to the other state’s law without any discussion.
The legal tangle within which these contract provisions exist may well account for
their summary treatment in the cases.
The dominant conflict of laws analysis has, similarly, tended to obscure the
contract issues embedded in choice of forum clauses in business forms.  Although
such court-choosing provisions are important in both the ALI’s and the Hague’s
efforts at international enforcement of judgments and related issues, both drafts paid
very little attention to the contract issues implicated by their work.  Once again,
there are few controversial issues with negotiated contracts and both drafting bodies
probably had negotiated contracts in mind when they developed their drafts.  This is
understandable in one sense; despite an occasional call to the contrary,145 the law
continues to lump adhesive business forms in with negotiated contracts and has, so
far, failed to adequately differentiate the two on the basis of assent.146 When
business forms are choosing the law and forum and recipients cannot understand the
provisions, even if they took the time to find and read them, one would hope that
contract law might have something to offer on whether these are true commitments
worth enforcing.  At the minimum, we might learn what it is about these contract
provisions that justifies their enforcement without any semblance of true assent of
Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum, and Arbitration
147.  See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & Soc. Rev. 95 (1974).
148.  The policy questions may well go to the core of our Federal system.
How much consumer protection a State supplies to its citizens vis a vis its businesses is,
obviously, the product a very complicated political process.  Delaware, which has prided itself on
creating a favorable business environment, no doubt derives tax revenues from businesses that settle
there and can thereby redistribute that revenue to its citizens in the form of lower taxes or other State
benefits.  One can imagine a political process that “trades” some level of consumer protection for a
favorable business environment and the benefits to a State that come from that.   A beauty of our
Federal system is that another State could have a completely different “mix,” choosing instead to offer
citizens legal protections unavailable elsewhere even if the business environment is not so favorable. 
The system works the way it is designed so long as citizens of given places get the “mix” that their
State delivers.
This Federal balance can be upset if part of the “mix” citizens get in one State is replaced with
part of the “mix” developed in a different State.  Assume, for purposes of illustration what many
business lobbyists assert, that a State’s consumer protection and its tax level are correlated, that is,
people who live in “high” consumer protection States get “high” taxes as part of the tradeoff and
people who live in “low” consumer protection States get “low” taxes as their tradeoff.  Whether either
hypothetical tradeoff is “good” is beside the point; both mixes are appropriate in our political system
and, indeed, the system fosters such differences.  Now suppose the citizens in the “high” consumer
protection State can have their consumer protection replaced (through choice of law provisions) with
the “low” State’s level.  Now, the citizens of the high tax State get a balance (low consumer protection
and high taxes) that neither State  legislature made.  While the “low” regulation State might even
foster such a result to make it even more attractive to businesses, cf. Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §
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the recipients, or how the widespread enforcement of these provisions affects the
theoretical grounding of contract law in party assent.  A better understanding of how
the contract operates in these settings will surely help to improve advocacy involving
these provisions in business form settings and thereby lead to richer judicial
decisions.
When deployed by out-of-State businesses, widespread choice of law and
forum clauses threaten the consumer and small business protection a State offers to
its residents.  This may be of concern to some State legislatures.  If a choice of forum
clause blocks a local suit, or drags the citizen to a distant jurisdiction, what began as
an uneven playing field147 became even more tilted.  If a choice of law clause can
replace the resident’s consumer protection with that of a State that offers less, we are
faced with a major issue of federalism and local control.148 Legislative action may be
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4.102(b)(1999) (requiring Delaware banks to use the law of Delaware in their transactions with
customers in other States ) such a result seems at odds with our Federal system.  
149.  Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3).
150.  Compare Klocek v. Gateway, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (D. Kan. 2000) with Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808, 118 S. Ct. 47, 139 L. Ed. 2d 13 (1997)).
151.  Cf. Specht v. Netscape Communications, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
152.  Cf. Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
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even more pressing inasmuch as a great deal of consumer law displacement could be
occurring out of sight, in negotiations and arbitrations that leave no records.  An
undeveloped–or wrong–judicial decision can have influence in that “echo chamber”
for years.  In such a legal environment, clear statutory norms are probably the most
effective vehicles for controlling the undesirable byproducts of the widespread
recognition of these provisions.
With adhesive business forms, the issues are predominantly contract issues–the
parties’ relationship to one another–rather than conflicts issues–the parties’ collective
authority vis a vis the State.  Contracts are not all the same and, while contract
scholars have not done a great job of it, they have been focusing on what
differentiates adhesion deals from negotiated contracts for many years.  These
adhesive contract provisions, too, deserve more attention than they have had from
contracts scholars if we want full, rich policy development of appropriate limits (if
any) to put on such provisions in given contexts.   Can a choice of law or forum
clause be considered “unconscionable” if its effect is to deprive a plaintiff of a class
action remedy?  Might the hidden effects of a choice of law provision violate a
customer’s “reasonable expectations”?149 Are choice of law or forum clauses binding
if packed in with the product and seen, if at all, only after purchase?150 Are they
enforceable if they appear in browseware?151 What if they arrive in a bill stuffer after
the initial relationship is established?152 None of these contract law questions is even
asked if we simply assume that the contract for law or forum is binding and move to
a conflicts analysis.  
Put simply, contract law offers unrealized potential for understanding
contracts for law, forum, and arbitration.  Seeing the contract more clearly within
these provisions is a first step; one can only hope that a better, richer policy
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discussion will follow.
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